1. What is the value of the information to the potential eavesdropper?
   
   This value, which may be completely different from its value to the owner of the information, tends to establish the threat level (the extent and expense to which the eavesdropper will go to gain the information). It also establishes, to some extent, the risk he will take to acquire the information. Obviously, if the information is of relatively low value, the eavesdropper will expend relatively little time and money and expose himself to very little risk.
   
   
2. Who constitutes the threat?
   
   This question is best answered by determining who can benefit from the interception. Depending on who and what benefit can be determined, there is some basis for an analysis of technical capability and the probability that specialist will be employed.
   
   
3. What is the desired duration of the interception?
   
   If the duration is short, (a two hour conference, for example) some interception techniques are more convenient and likely to be used than others. If the desired duration is an extended one (such as continuous monitoring of an office), techniques requiring batteries in the target area are much less likely to be used.
   
   
4. What other operational constraints are imposed on the eavesdropper?
   
   In answering this question, one must realize that the eavesdropper requires three successful links to accomplish his purpose.
   
   
   • He must have a concealable means of conveying the physical energy of the conversation to a medium which can be transmitted.
   • He must have a concealable means of transmitting (wire, light beam, radio, etc.).
   • He must have a location and the terminating equipment necessary to transform the transmitted data back to a form which can be used. Both the location and equipment must be concealed.
   
   
   If any one of these three links are detected or prevented, the eavesdropper has failed.
   
   Answering questions 1 through 3 may be relatively easy. The answer to question 4 normally requires expert evaluation of the specific problem area, if the evaluation is to be accomplished in depth. However, consideration of the data derived from the above questions will allow the non-specialist to make at least general threat evaluations.

NEGOTIATION ACTIONS

1. . Set aside a room solely for the use of negotiating officials when discussing any aspect of the negotiations. Ideally, this room would be at the end of a corridor, above ground level or in a basement area. (Rooms or suites within a hotel can be adapted for this purpose.) Walls should be of solid concrete or concrete block and extend from the true ceiling to the true floor. If the room has connecting doors, both rooms should be designated as secure areas and controlled accordingly. If rooms with solid walls cannot be acquired, plans for controlling adjoining rooms should be made.
2. Examine the room(s) prior to initial use to insure there are no security weaknesses (speakers, vents, false walls, etc.) or listening devices which would compromise your position. A physical and electronic examination of the room(s) may be required on a recurring basis during negotiations.
3. Secure the room prior to the examination and maintain the security posture during the entire period of negotiations. Security should be effected thought the joint use of security systems/security personnel, utilizing corporate personnel, off duty police officers or private security personnel. Insure that security personnel are not sympathetic to the opposing party. Change the lock(s), utilizing outside locksmith services, if practical. Control keys or access codes.
4. Thoroughly examine everything located within the room(s) to insure they contain no surreptitious listening devices. Thoroughly examine any items introduced after the initial examination to include food trays, plants, carts, electronic equipment, furniture, etc. Remove all intercom equipment. Provide for secure voice and fax communications.
5. Do not utilize telephones (standard, cellular or cordless types) to discuss any aspect of the negotiations unless secured or absolutely necessary (Telephone equipment rooms, equipment, wiring, instruments, etc., are generally accessible to any number of persons who may be sympathetic to the opposition).
6. Establish a separate room for negotiations with your opponents to prevent the introduction of listening devices. Under no circumstances should your opponents be allowed into YOUR designated secure room(s).
7. Do not discuss any aspect of your opponents requests or your established position outside the secure room(s). Negotiators should be made aware that anything said outside the room is subject to being compromised through a number of seemingly harmless methods.
8. Provide a CROSS CUT SHREDDER for the destruction of ALL trash generated as a result of negotiations or discussions. Protect all documents generated as a result of discussion by storing in lockable containers.
9. Remove and store one time (disposable) typewriter ribbons when not in use. Destroy by cutting or shredding.
10. If negotiations continue over a protracted period of time, repeat examinations.